

13274 TOP SECRET Copy 568 June 1964 70 Pages EVALUATIONS OF SOVIET SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT 13TH REVISION port of the Deployment Working Group of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

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| | Group (DWG), provide | es a comprehensivé, rea | dy-reference | listing of all | |
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| This report is the thirteenth revision of Evaluations of Soviet Surface-to-Surface Missile Deployment prepared by the Deployment Working Group of the Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. The twelfth revision, dated 1 April 1964, and disseminated under control number DIA-02082 64 KTC, can be destroyed in accordance with existing instructions for handling COMINT and TALENT-KEYHOLE materials and continuing analysis of previous missions and other sources have provided additional information on the Soviet ballis- | |
| The lack of KH-4 coverage of the USSR since our last revision has precluded further analysis of what appears to be a slowdown or cessation in Soviet deployment of both hard and soft sites of known configuration. In the twelfth revision we pointed out that usable photographic coverage of 12 of the 18 ICBM complexes since December 1963 revealed that no new soft site construction had been initiated at these complexes since September 1963. Further analysis reveals that no new hard sites have been begun at these complexes for a similar period of time. The total number of confirmed and probable deployed sites remains at 105 (238 launchers). Additionally, one site is carried in the possible category. Of the 238 launchers, 188 are considered to be operational. See Figure 1 for locations of deployed ICBM complexes. The ICBM launch sites have been designated by type, as shown and explained in Figure 2. have added significantly to our knowledge of ICBM site facilities. Figure 2 has been updated accordingly. No coverage | was obtained on Type I and Type IIA sites on these missions. SOFI SITES Type IIB Sites Coverage of Verkhnyaya Salda Launch Site E (5) and Yurya Launch Site F (7) and Plesetsk Launch Site B (5) not only provides functional identification of site facilities, but also points up apparent differences between sites of this type (Figures 3, 4, and 5). At the Verkhnyaya Salda and Yurya sites, for example, probable fuel and oxidizer vehicles are parked in the open near possible storage tanks. At Plesetsk, these vehicles and tanks are not apparent, and two additional structures, probably housing these vehicles, are located at opposite ends of the center road. An artist's concept of a Type IIB site is shown in Figure 6. Coverage of Yurya Launch Site D (4), also a Type IIB site, reveals a probable exercise underway, with an erected SS-7 missile and associated equipment on one of the launch pads (Figure 7). |

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
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
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| Good coverage of Type IID sites was obtained with Yurya Launch Site I (11) a typical example (Figure 8). The most significant aspect of this coverage was the snow-covered canted buildings located inboard of each pad. This photography reveals that these buildings have personnel entrances only, and indicates that the roofs are vented. This information and the apparent absence of fueling 'oxidizer' vehicles and 'or. facilities at Type IID sites strongly indicate that the canted buildings serve a fueling function. We believe, therefore, that the IID sites have an integral fueling system while the earlier Type IIB and IIA versions utilize a mobile system. An artist's concept of a Type IID site is shown in Figure 9. Type IIC Sites provide only nonstere ocverage of Type IIC sites. At the Kozelsk Complex, photography of Launch Site A (3) revealed that four tracks, each apparently consisting of two rails, emerge from each ready building and merge into a single track before entering the pad area (Figure 10). The single track continues up to the ring on the pad, but it is not clear whether it actually enters or crosses the ring itself. An artist's concept of a Type IIC site is shown in Figure 11. HARD SITES Type IIA Sites Provide a considerable amount of information on hard sites, particularly the IIIA type. Continuing evaluation should enable a more accurate assessment of the physical vulnerability of these sites, as well as assist in determining their mode of operation; i.e., fly-out or elevate-to-launch. The results of these missions strengthen our previous assessment of the physical vulnerability of these sites, as well as assist in determining their mode of operation; i.e., fly-out or elevate-to-launch. The results of these missions strengthen our previous assessment of the physical vulnerability of these sites, as well as assist in determining their mode of operation; i.e., fly-out or elevate-to-launch. The results of these missions strengthen our previous assessment of the physical vulnerability of these sites, | | |
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| Complex) to Kamchatka. This was the second such firing from an operational site. The first instance involved the successful launch of an unidentified-type ICBM from the Plesetsk Complex Other range activity included a successful SS-7 operation SS-7 operation an operation of unknown type and results a cancellation Soviet failure to utilize Flim Flam facilities indicates that the SS-8 firing probably represented an operational training exercise. Test Range facilities Covered parts of the Tyuratam Missile Test Center, but it did not add significantly to our knowledge of the Soviet ICBM test program. We have reviewed previous coverages of the rangehead facilities in an attempt to identify new launch areas. Two suspect areas were identified and examined in detail. |
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| The first is an installation located between Launch Complexes A (1) and B (2). This area (Figure 17) was first observed (April 1963), when only the rail and road were identified. It currently consists of a fenced area 2,500 by 1,900 feet, similar in configuration (but not in size) to Launch Complex G2 (11). The long axis is oriented north-south. There is an indistinct shallow excavation, approximately 210 by 125 feet, in the center of the fenced area. A building, approximately 75 by 20 feet, is visible adjacent to the excavation. The second area examined is located west of Launch Complex G and north of the complex main road (Figure 18). In April 1963 only the access road was visible. The area currently is fenced and contains one fairly large and one small building. Coverage of this installation has been poor and additional detail and mensuration cannot be determined. There has been no sense of urgency asso- |

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probable Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) high-frequency mainline communications links to areas of ICBM deployment. These do not approximate the number of ICBM complexes (18). One possible explanation ties the existence of SRF links with possible echelonment of the ICBM component of the SRF. If an ICBM site is in fact occupied by a battalion, then such complexes as Shadrinsk (3 sites), Itatka (3 sites), Tyumen (2 sites), Olovyannaya (3 sites), and Omsk (one,

possibly two sites) may be only regimentalsized units. That SRF links may terminate at ICBM division, or higher, level is suggested by the limited number of such links. Based on the probable identification of the Plesetsk (8 sites) and Yurya (11 sites) complex commanders as major generals, it is likely that these and other complexes of comparable size are at the division level. Smaller complexes may be grouped together under a divisional headquarters. For ex-




FIGURE 3. LAUNCH SITE E 151, VERKHNYAYA SALDA.

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
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
| ample, the Shadrinsk Complex (3 sites) may at present constitute a regiment and may be subordinate to a division headquarters at or near the Verkhnyaya Salda Complex. It is interesting to note that at least one high-frequency mainting link exists to each military district in which ICBM complexes are located. Thus in the Moscow Military District (MD) there are 29 sites and one SRF link; in the Northern MD, 8 sites and one link; Volga MD, 6 sites and one link; Ural MD, 29 sites and 3 links; Siberian MD, 16 sites and one link; Transhaila, 9 sites and one link (The grouping of these links to military districts does not necessarily reflect Order of Barte alignments.) With the exception of the Moscow MD, where the relatively short distances may create special intercept problems, the proportion of links to sites appears consistent. Consideration of available evidence suggests that a correlation exists between the size of complexes, | | | | |
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
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
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




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



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


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FIGURE 20. FISHBONE ANTENNA AT AUXILIARY SUPPORT FACILITY, VERKHNYAYA SALDA.

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| provide good coverage of a number of MRBM and IRBM sites, and furnish considerable detail which will require some time for full evaluation. No new sites were identified; however, one IRBM hard site at Taybola, previously carried as completed, was found to be still under construction. A total of 193 MRBM/IRBM sites (752 launchers) have been identified to date. Of the 752 launchers, 714 are estimated to be operational. In this revision, we have amended Table 3 (Summary Evaluation of Soviet MRBM/IRBM Deployment) to designate only the site name used in the Target Data Inventory (TDI). See Figure 21 for locations of deployed MRBM/IRBM complexes. Typical configurations of the launch sites are shown in Figure 22. Type IV hard site configurations have been updated, based on Missions SOFT SITES Sites Locking Usual Facilities We have previously reported (11th and 12th Revisions) a total of 8 MRBM/IRBM soft sites which lack the housing and support facilities usually associated with such sites. Although we are still unable to determine how they fit into the deployment pattern, some signs of activity were apparent at the Bayram Ali IRBM, and the Rozhdestvenka MRBM sites The only other site of this type covered was the Ramoye IRBM site, but no activity was visible. HARD SITES Type IV Sites (MRBM) Excellent coverage of the Kishentsy and Tym Launch Sites that there are four launch silos at MRBM hard sites. We, therefore, have amended Tables 1 and 3 accordingly. The Kishentsy Launch Site is shown in Figure 23. | Type IV Sites (IRBM) Provides the best coverage we have had to date of an IRBMhard site under construction. Evidence obtained from this photography of the Kalnik IRBM Launch Site (Figures 24 and 25) confirmed our previous assessment that all three silos are for launch purposes. Construction Stoppage or Slowdown In the twelfth revision, we indicated that an apparent slowdown or stoppage in construction at 2 hard MRBM and 8 IRBMsites had occurred. Additionally, photography of the Taybola 3 IRBM Launch Site revealed that this facility, opreviously carried as completed based on construction (Figure 26). This brings to 11 the total number of hard sites which are considerably behind normal construction schedules. KAPUSTIN YAR MISSILE TEST CENTER Test Ronge Facilities furnish the first coverage obtained of some parts of the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Center in over two years. Excellent cloud-free photography enabled us to update information on this test center and to extract considerable detail on activities at the rangehead. Coverage of Launch Complex A (Figure 27) shows an erected SS-4 missile and associated equipment on the southern launch pad The missile is apparently being serviced at the time of photography. Of significance is the fact that we had previously associated this facility only with the short-range-ballistic-missile program. Launch Area 1C (Figure 28) appears inactive; however, two new launch positions are under construction in the northeast part of the area. An apparent SS-4 exercise is underway of the main launch pad at Launch Area 3C (Figure |

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
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
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| | |
| An SS-4 mignile on its transporter is vi- | Anna Maria |
| 9). An SS-4 missile on its transporter is vis- de, as well as other vehicles. On the adjacent | tent bivouac area are discernible. Numerous |
| outhwest pad, about 20 vehicles can be seen. | items of equipment are scattered throughout this |
| At Launch Site 4C1, the prototype for de- | area. |
| oyed MRBM hard sites, all four silo covers | A large unidentified facility was observed |
| re clearly visible (Figures 30 and 31). The | west of Launch Complex B (Figure 38) |
| o forward silos are open, and the cover of the | The facility is secured and rail served. Although we cannot assign a function to |
| ortheast silo has been moved a considerable | this area, its configuration and location indicate |
| stance back from the silo opening. A shelter | that it will not be launch associated. |
| s been erected over this particular silo, indi- | Test Range Activities |
| ting that some repair or maintenance is taking | Firing activity on the Kapustin Yar range |
| ace. The silo covers appear to be dome- | was very light during April and the first half of |
| aped. | May 1964. Some of the activity, however, may |
| Launch Site 4C2, the prototype for deployed | be significant in the light of observations on the |
| BM hard sites, is shown in Figures 32 and 33. | of the range- |
| onsiderable activity is apparent at the site and | head. A ballistic missile apparently was launch- |
| veral items of equipment are visible. | ed successfully to a range of 440 nm |
| At Launch Site 5C1 (Figure 34), two tactical- | This operation appeared similar to opera- |
| e missiles on carriers are visible on the left | tions conducted (possible firing to |
| orthern) pad, while on the right (southern) pad | at least a 300-nm range) (either |
| unidentified missile on a transporter can be | launch failure or cancellation). The possibility |
| en. Several missile-associated vehicles are | of a new short-range-ballistic-missile test pro- |
| scernible on or near both pads. These sight- | gram appears to be indicated, although the testing |
| s appear to conflict with our previous assess- | of new components for other systems cannot be |
| ent that this site was utilized solely for the exactional training of SS-5 units. | excluded. |
| | Other operations of interest during the |
| reveals that Launch Site 5C2 gure 35) is incomplete and that no construction | period included the firing of a probable SS-4 to |
| exress has occurred since October 1962 | the 1,020-nm range firing of an |
| saress has occurred affice occuber 1902 | unidentified missile to the 630-nm range |
| both show signs of | a launch to the 150-nm impact area |
| ivity at Launch Complex E. | and the apparent cancellation of an operation to the 2,200-nm impact area |
| ows that some snow had been cleared from | FIXED FIELD SITES |
| pad area, but otherwise no apparent change | Launch Area 2G at Kapustin Yar (Figure 39) |
| facilities since TALENT photography of De- | probably represents the prototype for the 12 |
| nber 1959. Figure 36) reveals | fixed field sites identified to date (See 12th Re- |
| small unidentified objects north of the pad, | vision, page 8). |
| several unidentified vehicles present within | The purpose of these sites is still undeter- |
| fenced area. | mined, Continuing analysis indicates that all |
| Details of the Troop Training and Support | probably do not serve the same purpose. A few |
| ea (Figure 37) were furnished | may actually represent the alternate/reserve |
| w construction of permanent-type billets and a | MRBM positions referred to in IRONBARK docu- |
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
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| | ments; others, located too near permanent facilities to serve this function, may be training facilities; several may represent early deployment of the SS-3 system. In any event, a capability of MRBM units to fire from minimum-prepared positions was confirmed in Cuba and we believe that all such units are currently, capable of moving to, and firing from, field-type positions. The limited requirements for such positions primarily survey and a level pad area are such that many of these positions are not susceptible to detection by overhead reconnaissance vehicles, particularly if the positions are not susceptible to detection by overhead reconnaissance vehicles, particularly if the positions are unoccupied. STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES MERM/IRBM SITE COMMUNICATIONS LINKS Continuing analysis of photography from various missions has brought to light high-frequency communications facilities at a number of MRBM/IRBM sites. Fishbone antennae have been observed at the Ugolnyy, Novosysoyevka 1, Kara Babau 1 (Figure 40), and Kurgancha 2 launch sites. Two double rhombics are located near Anastasyevka (Figure 41). A large microwave tower is also associated with the Anastasyevka Complex, as well as with the Taybola launch sites. It is significant that the general orientation of these high-frequency communications facilities is toward Moscow. | | | | |
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


FIGURE 38. UNIDENTIFIED FACILITY WEST OF LAUNCH COMPLEX B, KAPUSTIN YAR.

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FIGURE 40. FISHBONE ANTENNA AT KARA BABAU 1 IRBM LAUNCH SITE.




FIGURE 41. DOUBLE RHOMBIC ANTENNAS NEAR ANASTASYEVKA MRBM LAUNCH COMPLEX.


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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED STATUS OF IDENTIFIED IGBW AND MRBM/IRBM LAUNCHERS AT DEPLOYED

| Туре | Sites | Launchers | Operational | U/C | Type | Sites | Launchers | Operational | U/C |
|------|-------|-----------|-------------|-----|-----------|-------|---|-----------------|------|
| | 3 | ICBM | | | ; | 9 | MRBM/IRBM | | 1 |
| IIA | 5 | 10 . | 4 | 0 | I) | 84 | 336 | 336 | 0 |
| IIB | 20 | | 10 | 0 | I II j | 53 | 212 | 212 | 0 |
| | 29 | 58 | 58 | 0 | III \ | 15 | 60 | [*] 60 | ō |
| IIC | 7 | 14 | 14 | 0 | IV (MRBM) | 2(1) | 84 | 76 | ءَ ء |
| IID | 31 | 62 | 60 | 2 | IV (IRBN) | 20 | 60 | 30 | 30 |
| IIIA | . 26 | 78 | 39 | 39 | | | • | 30 | 30 |
| IIIB | 4 | 12 | 3 | 9 | } | | | | |
| OTAL | 105 | 238 ~ | 158 | 50 | тотац | 193 | 752 | 714 | 38 |

^{*}See Tables 2 and 3 for details. Figures include three launch silos at Type III ICBM and Type IV IRBM sites, and four launch silos at Type IV MRBM sites.

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| OROVA VANA 4 Site B (4) Site B (2) Site B (2) Site C (3) 50 54N 113 (8E IIIA 5 Site C (3) Site C (3) Site C (3) Site C (3) | MACOSHRICS | Size Color Size | CHESS Nistroad Security Se | Sate D (a) Sate E (b) Sate E (c) Sat | Sto V(3) | DROVIANA | Location Coordinates Type of Number of Location Sile Sile Location Hard | Table 2. Sewary evaluation of soviet | | |
|---|------------|--|--|---|---|--|---|--------------------------------------|---|--|
| 64 Operation at U.C. U.C. | 63 | 64 65 Operational C C C C C C C C C | 61 62 62 63 63 64 65 64 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 | 63 65 U.C. CRM 62 Operational | 64 65 65 65 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C | 63 64 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 | E-stinated Quarter E-stinated | ET ICHN DEPLOYMENT | • | |

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| 61 62 62 62 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 | 50 10N 48:28E HD 50 10N 49:32E HA 50 0N 19:40E HA 50 13N 69:52E JB 50:18N 69:52E HB 50:24N 69:17E HB 50:24N 69:17E HB 50:24N 69:17E HB |
| 64 63 63 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 | 2 2 2 2 3 3 |
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| | | TABLE 3. (Contin | nucd) | |
|-------------------|--|---|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | LOCATION• | COORDINATES | TYPE NO OF PADS LAUNCHERS | ESTIMATED CONSTR STATUS |
| | BYKHOV Launch Complex SLEDYUKI | 53-41-50N 30-20-30E | 11 4 | Complete |
| | DERAZHNYA Launch Complex DERAZHNYA 1 DERAZHNYA 2 | 49-21-00N 27-26-30E 49-26-15N 27-29-00E | II 4 | Complete Complete |
| 1 | KHMELNITSKIY DISNA Launch Complex | 49-24-45N 27-08-45E | IV (MR) 4 | Complete |
|) - n | DISNA Launen Comptex DISNA ZELKI BORKOVICHI | 55-35-15N 28-16-00E 55-35-45N 28-24-30E 55-41-45N 28-27-00E | 1 4 | Complete Complete Complete |
| י ר | DOLINA Launch Complex | 49-03-30N 24-03-30E | | |
|] | DOLINA 1 DOLINA 2 BOLEKHOV | 49-03-30N 24-03-30E 49-06-15N 24-08-30E 49-06-45N 23-51-15E | 1 4 | Complete Complete Complete |
| | DROGOBYCH Launch Complex MEDENITSA | 49-22-15N 23-45-30E | | Complete |
| - 56 - | DROGOBYCH STRYY | 49-25-30N 23-34-45E 49-16-45N 23-43-00E | | Complete Complete |
| Σ | DYATLOVO Launch Complex DYATLOVO BEREZOVKA | 53-32-45N 25-16-48E 53-32-20N 25-17-80E | 4 | Complete Complete |
| | ZBLYANY GELLI Launch Complex | 53-35-45N 25-27-30E | 11 4 | Complete |
| • | KAKASHURA GELLI PARAUL | 42-38-45N 47-27-00E 42-26-30N 47-28-30E 42-47-30N 47-23-00E | IV (IR) 3 | Complete Complete Complete |
| | GOMEL Launch Complex BORKHOV 1 | 52-18-30N 30-42-45E | | Complete |
| | BORKHOV 2 GRANOV Launch Complex | 52-24-45N 30-39-00E | II 4 | Complete |
| | GRANOV 1 GRANOV 2 KALNIK | 48-56-15N 29-30-15E 48-50-00N 29-28-45E 48-59-30N 29-21-45E | IV (IR) 3 | Complete Late Mid |
| | GRESK Launch Complex GRESK 1 GRESK 2 | 53-14-15N 27-42-30E 53-17-00N 27-40-45E | | Complete Complete |

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| | | TABLE'3. (Continued) | | |
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| | LOCATION* | COORDINATES TYL | | ESTIMATED CONSTI- STATUS |
| | GROZNYY Launch Complex SUNZHENSKOYE NESTEROVSK WYA ACHKHOY-MARTAN | 43-08-15N 44-54-15E I 43-11-30N 44-57-00E I 43-10-30N 45-10-30E IV (| 4 4 4 MR) 4 | Complete Complete Complete |
| * * | GUSEV Launch Complex GUSEV 1 GUSEV 2 | 54-41-30N 22-05-00E I 54-44-00N 22-03-30E I | 1 | Complete Complete |
| | GVARDEYSK Launch Complex GVARDEYSK 1 GVARDEYSK 2 | 54-40-30N 21-07-30E 1 54-45-15N 21-09-15E 1 | 4 4 | Complete Complete |
| | JELGAVA Launch Complex IECAVA 1 IECAVA 2 IECAVA 3 | 56-35-30N 24-04-00E II 56-39-45N 24-07-30E II 56-33-00N 24-20-30E IV (| 4 4 (MR) 4 | Complete Complete Complete |
| | JONAWA Launch Complex KARMELAWA JONAWA | 54-57-15N 24-05-45E II 55-01-00N 24-14-15E II | 4 4 | Complete Complete |
| - 57 - | KAMENETS-PODOLSKIY Launch Complex KAMENETS-PODOLSKIY DUNAYEVTSY | 48-51-15N 26-42-30E II 48-55-15N 26-59-00E II | 4 4 | Complete Complete |
| | KIVERTSY Launch Complex KIVERTSY 1 KIVERTSY 2 TROSTAINETS 2 | 50-53-15N 25-31-00E 1 50-56-00N 25-36-15E 1 50\(\overline{\text{20}}\)-30N 25-39-30E II | 4 4 1 | Complete Complete Complete |
| <u> </u> | KONKOVICHI Launch Complex PETRIKOV KONKOVICHI | 52-10-30N 28-34-45E 1 1 52-15-30N 28-37-45E I | 1 | Complete Complete , |
| | KOROSTEN Launch Complex KOROSTEN 1 KOROSTEN 2 | 50-51-45N 28-18-15E II 50-52-15N 28-31-00E II | 4 | Complete Complete |
| | KOZHANOVICHI Launch Complex KOZHANOVICHI I KOZHANOVICHI 2 | 52-10-15N 27-54-30E I 52-11-30N 27-48-00E I | 4 4 | Complete Complete |
| | KRASKINO Launch Complex KRASKINO | 42-44-00N 130-40-15E II | 4 | Complete |


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| | | · | TABLE 3. (Continued) | |
| | | LOCATION* | COORDINATES TYPE NO OF PADS LAUNCHERS | ESTIMATED CONSTR STATUS |
| | | ZAGARE Launch Complex ZAGARE 1 ZAGARE 2 LIELELEJA | 56-23-15N 23-19-15E I 4 56-29-00N 23-20-15E I 4 56-24-30N 23-36-15E IV (MR) 4 | Complete Complete Complete |
| TOP | a | ZHITOMIR Launch Complex ZHITOMIR 1 ZHITOMIR 2 BERDICHEX | 50-04-45N 28-15-45E II 4 50-10-00N 28-16-15E II 4 50-05-30N 28-22-00E III 4 | Complete Complete Complete Complete |
| SECRET | | ZHMERINKA Launch Complex GNIVAN ZHMERINKA VINNITSA | 49-09-00N 28-11-45E II 4 49-10-15N 28-05-00E II 4 49-17-30N 28-29-15E IV (MR) 4 | Complete COM |
| Ê | | ZHURAVKA Launch Complex ZHURAVKA | 54-36-30N 76-39-45E III 4 | Complete |
| CHE | - 62 | ZNAMENSK Launch Complex ZNAMENSK 1 ZNAMENSK 2 | 54-32-45N 21-11-15E I 4 54-35-15N 21-07-30E I 4 | |
| CHESS RUFF | | *TDI site desegnators have been adopted for MRBM IRBM | Launch Sites, | Complete Complete SS |
| : | | | | |

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